The twentieth anniversary of nafta is an opportunity to reflect on what has happened to migration flows. In this essay, the author gives an overview of the trends of Mexican legal high-and low-skilled migration flows as well as of unauthorized flows to the United States, which have increased significantly during the last 20 years, contrary to original expectations. She takes Mexican migration to Canada as a reference for comparison since the flows are less dynamic.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta) has no provisions for migration among the three countries, despite the strong pressure Mexico's negotiators brought to bear during the Salinas administration (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) to include articles about the free movement of persons across borders. One of the benefits of nafta was supposed to be that the dynamic exchange of goods would foster greater economic development in Mexico, creating an important number of jobs with significant increases in wages and, as a result, reducing the pressures to emigrate north. 1 As an incentive to trade, nafta allowed investment and transfers between companies, as well as temporary moves of professionals and their families. It established a specific non-immigrant tn visa (Trade nafta) exclusively for several categories of professionals.
During the 20 years since nafta came into effect, it has indeed brought broad regional economic interaction among many sectors, greater dynamism in foreign investment, and myriad trade transactions that have led to diverse businesses opening in Mexico. However, the predicted growth of the Mexican economy due to the implementation of nafta, which was supposed to be enough to create a lot of jobs in Mexico and eventually diminish the flow of Mexican migrants to the United States, did not materialize. Not only that, but the flow actually increased, mainly during the first 15 years, since the push-pull factors of Mexican migration to the United States have persisted, mainly in periods of economic growth during the nafta era.
In this essay, I will present an overview of the trends of Mexican legal migration flows (high-and low-skilled), as well as of unauthorized flows to the United States over the last 20 years. For that purpose, I begin by describing a very broad perspective of the main economic trends during this period. Secondly, I analyze the legal entries or visas issued to Mexicans as immigrants or temporary workers in the U.S., as well as the trends in the naturalization process by our citizens. In the third place, I explore the trends of unauthorized flows, which increased significantly during the nafta era. It is important to mention that Mexican migration to Canada is always taken as a reference point for comparison, looking at different types of visas or en-essaYs of foreigners entering Mexico for different purposes and categories and the new phenomenon of "return migration."
A bRieF AnALysis oF economic deveLopment in the nAFtA Region nafta created a US$19 trillion regional market by uniting the economies of the United States, Canada, and Mexico with around 470 million consumers. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce calculates that some six million U.S. jobs depend on trade with Mexico and eight million on trade with Canada. Nevertheless, the differences in economic development between Mexico and its neighbors and partners are still abysmal. The United States is the world's largest economy, Canada the eleventh, and Mexico the fifteenth, calculated by gross domestic product (gdp), according to World Bank figures (2014b . Despite these enormous differences in development levels, Mexico could be considered a successful example of economic integration, mainly due to the expansion of its international trade and increased foreign direct investment (fdi) in its businesses from both partner countries.
It is fair to recognize that during the last 20 years, Mexico's trade and fdi grew outstandingly. Today, Canada ranks as the United States' largest single export market and Mexico is the second. Intraregional trade flows have increased by roughly 400 percent, from around US$290 billion in 1993 to over US$1.1 trillion in (Hills, 2014 . Each day, the United States conducts over US$3.2 billion in trade with its North American neighbors: nearly US$2 billion in goods and services cross the U.S.-Canadian border, and Mexico exports roughly about US$1 billion worth of goods per day to the United States (Lanthemann, 2014) . Mexico increased its imports more than ten-fold from around US$71 billion in 1993 to close to US$420 billion in 2013 (see Figure 1A ). Its exports grew at the same pace, from around US$50 billion in 1993 to nearly US$400 billion in 2013 (see Figure 1B) , that is, from US$144 million to US$1 billion a day, making it the fourth largest trading partner for the U.S. Even though over the years Mexico has relied heavily on the United States as an export market, this reliance has diminished during the nafta era. The percentage of Mexico's total exports going to the United States decreased from 83 percent in 1993 to 78 percent in 2012.
Between 1993 and 2012, the U.S. share of Mexico's imports decreased from 78 percent to 55 percent. China is Mexico's second leading source of imports (Fergusson and Villa rreal, 2014) .
Although bilateral trade between Canada with Mexico has grown more than six-fold since nafta took effect in 1994, reaching US$28 billion in 2012, it is still very Figure 1A EXPORTS (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (billions of U.S. dollars) Source: Developed by the author using data from International Monetary Fund (2013) . IMPORTS (1994 IMPORTS ( -2013 (billions of U.S. dollars) Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (n.d.) and Fergusson and Villarreal (2014: 30 Figure 2 ). (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (at historical cost basis, billions of U.S. dollars)
Figure 1B
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (n.d.) and Fergusson and Villarreal (2014: 30 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2011 , 2012a , and 2012b lation survey data shows that 40 percent of Mexican migrants with jobs were earning less than US$20 000 a year, and 17 percent earned more than US$40 000 a year (Fundación bbva Bancomer et al., 2014) .
the gRoWth oF mexicAn non-immigRAnt Admissions in the u.s.
During the 1990s, an important number of foreign highly-and low-skilled temporary workers were hired in the U.S. labor market because of that decade's sustained economic growth. Department of Homeland Security (dhs) data shows the multiple entries a visa holder may make in one year. Therefore, in general terms, if we compare number of visas issued with the total number of legal entries per fiscal year, we can find an important increase of entries per visa issued in this period, growing from 1.6 entries to 6.8 entries per visa granted (Jiménez, 2013) . This means that foreign workers with visas go back and forth within a year more frequently than they did before. In order to understand which types of non-immigrant are hired in the U.S. labor market, I have divided the analysis into high-and low-skilled types of labor.
highLy-skiLLed mexicAn non-immigRAnts
Today, the largest share of U.S. work visas for all nationalities goes to highly skilled workers, contrary to the widespread belief that most visas go to unskilled laborers.
This has been the case during the nafta era. In 2010, 74 percent of the all visas were H1-B visas, L-type for intra company transferees, and nafta visas (tn) (Jiménez, 2013) .
The number of highly skilled Mexican temporary workers granted H1-B visas during this period did not grow significantly, rising from 2 785 in 1997 to 3 683 in 2013, which represents only 2.4 percent of the total 153 223 visas granted in this category in that year. However, it occupied the third place after India, which received 65 percent, and China (see Table 1 ). The difference is that, during this period, they travel more often to Mexico; due to this, the number of admissions has grown significantly:
while in 1997, there were 5 273 Mexican admissions, in 2012, there were 29 794. (2012) , and for 2012, Monger (2013) .
The same has happened with L1 visas (intercompany transferees): in 1997, 2 346 visas were granted to Mexicans (6 percent of a total 36 589), and the number grew to 4 079 visas in 2013 (6 percent of a total 66 700). During this period, Canada moved from the sixth to first place with 25 percent. In addition, today they go back and forth more often to Mexico.
Based on the bilateral Free Trade Agreement signed by the United States and
Canada in 1989, nafta established four types of persons to whom a non-immigrant Trade nafta or tn visa would be granted: business visitors, merchants, investors, and people transferred between companies. Around 60 classifications of professionals receive this status: 25 general professionals; 23 types of scientists; 12 professionals in the medical and biology sciences, and 3 in academic areas. tn status provides for a temporary stay of one year that can be renewed indefinitely. Holders of tn visas are not allowed to obtain permanent residence; this is why most professionals tend to apply for a H1-B visa, which can last six years and then the migrant can request permanent residence. It is important to mention that while Mexicans need to apply for essaYs a tn visa, Canadians do not, since they can get it upon entry to U.S. territory; this is a great inequality among partners not registered in their published statistics. Twenty years after nafta came into effect, the number of tn visas granted to Mexicans in the United States has been ridiculously low. Table 1 shows that the number of Mexican professional tn visa holders grew from 171 in 1997, to 9 548 in 2013. However, although they have grown over recent years, they are insignificant compare with the tremendous size of trade between the two countries.
Contrary to the belief that most Mexicans living abroad are low skilled with only very basic education, new studies have found that the number of Mexican professionals already living in the U.S., with or without authorization, has grown significantly. According to the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey data, the number of Mexican immigrants with some level of professional education or equivalent experience more than doubled between 2000 and 2010, going from a little over 400 000 to more than 1 million; and the number with graduate studies increased at an even higher rate, from 62 000 to almost 151 000 (Alba, 2013) . A recent study released by Tuirán and Ávila (2013) 
LoW-skiLLed mexicAn non-immigRAnts
Unskilled Mexicans workers have gained an important place obtaining legal visas, mainly as agricultural workers, with H2-A visas, and non-agricultural workers, with H2-B visas. In this sense, Mexicans were granted 14 percent of all visas issued in both categories in 1990; this number almost doubled, with 26 percent of the total, in 2010 (Gonzalez Barrera and Lopez, 2013: 16) .
Specifically, Mexican agricultural workers have been granted significantly more visas to work in the U.S. and maintain the same proportion against other nationalities. Table 1 shows that, while in 1997, 16 011 visas were issued to Mexican workers Table 2 ). This represents a difference of 3 200 visas from those published by the Mexican government, and it is not 9 The Mexican Consulate in Toronto has published that 18 499 were hired in 2013 (Consulado General de México en Toronto, 2014). 10 Mexico was in second place after the United States with 36 346 temporary workers (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012a) 1974 1977 1980 1993 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 Source: Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (2013) .
essaYs specified whether they were high-or low-skilled workers. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that official Canadian statistics demonstrate that the number of foreign workers present in Canada has grown steadily: from 93 497 temporary workers present in 1994 to 338 213 in (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012a and 2012b . Only 7 678 Mexicans were granted H2-B visas to work in the United States as non-agricultural foreign workers in 1997, as shown in Table 1 The lack of leadership within the three countries to go beyond nafta has been evident. They have started to grow again due to the economic recovery: in 2013, the undocumented population was estimated at 11.7 million (52 percent of Mexican origin). In fact, a recent study reveals that during recent months, the unemployment rate of Mexican migrants in the U.S. has begun to decline, standing at very close to the national average. This is because incipient job growth has begun in the sectors that employ around 60 percent of Mexican immigrants (with or without authorization):
agriculture, leisure and hospitality, construction, manufacturing, and wholesale and retail trade (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez Barrera, 2013) .
12 In fiscal year 2012, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (cbp) prevented nearly 145 000 individuals from entering U.S. territory, down from 215 600 in fiscal year 2011 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012).
norteaMérica Even though 6.1 million unauthorized Mexicans are still living in the U.S., three-fifths of them have lived there for more than a decade (Walter, 2012) . For the first time in recent history, according to a Pew Hispanic study, Mexican-U.S. migration has registered an important shift in migration flows. Net migration (Mexicans who come to the U.S., the in-flow, minus those returning to Mexico, the out-flow) has reached an equilibrium (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez Barrera, 2012) . Net migration from Mexico to the United States, both legal and illegal, now stands at zero or less. In other words, the number of migrants coming to the U.S. from Mexico is equal to, or less than, the number of migrants leaving or being deported from the United
States and returning to Mexico (Walter, 2012) . This phenomenon, known as the "zero net migration point," seems to be the result of several factors: the U.S. recession and slow economic growth since 2007 have weakened the U.S. job market, especially in housing construction; the rise in the U.S. unemployment rate created fewer jobs for both immigrant and native-born workers; increased border security, enforcement measures, and record-setting numbers of deportations of both unauthorized and legal immigrants (and their U.S.-citizen children); and the rising dangers associated with illegal border crossings. The establishment of more restrictive measures for U.S. employers like the E-Verify program has also made it harder to hire unauthor- Finally -but no minor problem-the very harsh anti-immigrant environment in some states during the last decade has had the effect of undocumented aliens emigrating either to other states with less anti-immigrant attitudes or going back to their countries of origin, or remaining and being much more vulnerable, because it is highly costly and risky to re-enter the U.S., and even more so if they have family members left some place. 14 Within Mexico, several reasons have influenced this slowdown in the migration flow: the long-term decline in the birth rate; an increase in the average age of the Mexican population; and a broad improvement in Mexican economic conditions that has led to growing job opportunities that are lessening the pressure on Mexicans to leave their country in search of better opportunities. In spite of this new situation, I agree with Francisco Alba that even though nominal wage differentials have been hovering for years at about a 10-to-1 ratio for manual and semi-skilled jobs in favor of the United States, it is still very attractive to migrate. Whether this change is cyclical or structural remains to be seen, and will be put to a test once the U.S. economy is in full recovery and returns to dynamic growth (Alba, 2013) .
So far, during the five years of the Obama administration, from 2009 to 2013, the dhs has deported almost 2 million immigrants (Gonzalez Barrera, 2014) . By comparison, 2.2 million migrants were deported during the eight years of the George W.
Bush administration (see Figure 5 ). The Obama administration apparently has had the aim of deporting mainly "criminal illegals," but the truth has been that U.S. authorities have conducted brutal enforcement raids to localize undocumented aliens in their homes, on the streets, and in work places, without really trying to penalize employers who "illegally" hire undocumented aliens. Graph 3 shows that more than half of the deported aliens are not criminals.
A new phenomenon has emerged that is very difficult to resolve: unaccompanied children who arrive in the U.S. from Central America, mainly Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. The number had increased significantly to 57 000 children 13 The dhs has been upgrading the system so that it can access additional databases and more carefully filter applications. From 2007 to 2012, E-Verify queries from employers increased from 3.3 million to more than 21 million. As of February 2013, more than 432 000 employers were using the system to confirm the eligibility of prospective employees (Bloomberg Editors, 2014) . 14 These states are emblematic precisely because they are relatively "new destinations" compared to the traditional ones, or their Latino populations grew rapidly, and locals have reacted adversely to their visible presence (Verea, 2012; Levine and Verea, 2014) .
-40 percent are girls-by July 2014, compared with 39 000 in 2013, 15 overwhelming the capacity to accommodate them. 16 A recent report by the United Nations Human
Rights Council (unhrc) on unaccompanied children leaving Central America and
Mexico found that not all of them were seeking family reunification or looking for better economic opportunities. Instead, 58 percent said they were fleeing violence related to organized criminal groups or domestic violence in their families (Nazario, 2014) . The report stated that the number of asylum requests by children had increased by 432 percent (unhrc, 2014) . This has aggravated the perception of some U.S. citizens that the government is out of control. President Obama has requested US$3.7 billion from Congress to deal with the crisis calling it an "urgent humanitarian situation." The president stated that the money will be used to set up new detention facilities, deploy more aerial surveillance, and hire immigration judges and border patrol personnel to respond to the flood of children (Ricardi, 2014) . Restrictionists or anti-immigrant advocates will take advantage of pushing migration policy toward a more restrictive reinforcement policy instead of a policy of integration and legalization, something that will feed Republican elections campaign, even though they do not want to be seen as too extreme on the issue. Meanwhile, Democrats are hesitating about how best to handle the issue in order not to radicalize their positions.
I agree with the United Nations recommendations; that is, this is a human problem 15 In 2011 and 2012, 16 000 and 25 000 unaccompanied children arrived in the U.S. (Couronne, 2014) . 16 A June 2014 internal draft Homeland Security memo estimated that the number of unaccompanied children, mostly Central Americans and Mexicans, could climb to 90 000 for the fiscal year. cbp has also recorded a more modest, but significant, increase in apprehensions of unaccompanied Mexican children, going from 11 768 in FY 2011 to 17 240 in FY 2013 and 11 577 in the first eight months of FY 2014 (Isacson, Meyer, and Morales, 2014) . and has to be treated as a refugee crisis. They support the creation of emergency ref-
ugee centers inside our borders, tent cities, operated by the United Nations and other relief groups like the International Rescue Committee, where immigrant children could be held for 60 to 90 days instead of being released (Nazario, 2014) .
Aware that the large number of undocumented aliens, both adults and children, are a big problem that must be solved, the U.S. Congress has debated and approved several bills (in 2006 and 2007) to reform its clearly broken immigration system, bills that were frozen for six years. Surprisingly, in 2013 the Senate passed the comprehensive bipartisan Border Security, Economic Competitiveness, and Immigration
Modernization Act of 2013 (S. 744) . This bill includes, among many initiatives, increased border security and an enhanced E-Verify, a guest worker program; modifications in the visa system and a legalization program with a 13-year path to citizenship. The House of Representatives has decided not to support the Senate bill and instead has proposed several initiatives, a piecemeal approach instead of a comprehensive one, emphasizing stricter border enforcement, with no intention, so far, of legalizing the 11.7 million unauthorized migrants with a path to citizenship. 17 President Obama, tired of the House of Representatives' inaction, has said he has no choice but to act alone. And, while legal experts say he has the authority as president to take bold steps, offering temporary deportation relief to as many as half the country's entire population of undocumented immigrants, 18 this could result in a political firestorm and make the immigration issue more divisive.
Unfortunately, the immigration debate is ticking at the same pace as the elec- immigration legislation, whether they become law or not, immigration reform debate will still be a part, though not necessarily a major one, of presidential campaign issues for both candidates (Renshon, 2014) . 17 For more information, see Verea (2014) . 18 In 2012, Obama took sweeping executive action on immigration called Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (daca), a program in which immigrants brought to the U.S. as children, called Dreamers, were allowed to remain in the country without fearing deportation; this was highly criticized by conservative Republicans (Verea, 2014) .
norteaMérica FoReigneRs in mexico And the neW phenomenA oF "RetuRn migRAtion"
Mexico has always been a traditional migrant sending country, mainly to the United
States. But today, besides being a country of emigration, it is one of immigration, transit, asylum, and return migration. Generally speaking, we can say that in the past Mexico has had a restrictive migration policy; its foreign-born residents represent only 1 percent of the population, compared to Canada and the United States, where 21 percent and 13 percent, respectively, are foreign-born. 19 However, we must recognize that it has been very generous in receiving many foreigners persecuted for various reasons, such the case of the Spanish, Argentinians, Chileans, Cubans, and, as already mentioned, many Central Americans in different periods of Mexican history.
Nevertheless, a new phenomena has emerged: Mexico's foreign-born population has doubled during the last decade. Table 3 Mexican-born adults make up just under three-quarters of the total flow; Mexicanborn children are about 5 percent and U.S.-born children of Mexican parents are the 19 The states with most foreigners are Baja California (about 123 000), Jalisco (84 000), Chihuahua (80 000), Mexico City's Federal District (72 000) , and Tamaulipas. After registering relatively few foreigners in 2000, Hidalgo was the state with the fastest growing number of foreigners, up 402 percent by 2010, followed by Tlaxcala (333 percent), Tabasco (281 percent), and Veracruz and Oaxaca (both with 272) (Rhoda and Burton, 2010) . 20 For example, between 2010 and 2012, the U.S. government removed approximately 200 000 parents of U.S.-citizen children (Wessler, 2012) . It is true that the increased trade and investment did necessarily serve as a catalyst to promote the move of professionals, mainly U.S. citizens, to the Mexican labor market. Mexico's government established a formal process to permit the entry of foreign professionals, allowing both domestic and foreign companies to take advan- (1990, 2000, and 2010) Others 5.5 6.7 5.1 * Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. ** Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Source: Consejo Nacional de Población (2010, 1990) . Table 4 ). Figure 6 ). The entries of foreigners residing as non-immigrants in Mexico also grew significantly, from 84 000 entries at the beginning of the 1990s to 493 600 in 2012
(permanent residents from 33 400 to 150 600 and temporary residents from 50 000 entries to 342 000) (Centro de Estudios Migratorios, 2012) . Source: Centro de Estudios Migratorios (2013) .
It is important to stress that according to the Mexican census, 45.3 percent of immigrants in Mexico are in the work force; of these, only 4 out of every 100 are unemployed or looking for a job. Of the total employed immigrant population, around seven out of ten work in activities related to the services sector (Fundación bbva Bancomer, bbva Research, and Segob, 2014) .
Traditionally, we have received "border workers" mainly along our southern border, from Guatemala and Belize. They receive regional temporary visitor visas and temporary border worker permits. For example, 5 561 permanent and temporary residents from Guatemala were registered in 2013 (see Table 5 (Lanthemann, 2014) .
Regarding transmigrants, Mexico has faced an important problem of simultaneously being a stopover for transit migrants, primarily undocumented, mostly from Central America on the way to the United States, and a traditional flow of temporary workers from Central America and a few other countries to work in Mexico. Today, (González-Murphy and Koslowski, 2011) . This new law governs migration to, from, and through Mexico. The law came into effect in 2012 to better regulate visitors, temporary and permanent migrant flows, and to ensure migrants' rights in the face of increasing violations, including those of transmigrants whose rights are hugely violated in their hazardous sojourn through Mexico to the United States.
As mentioned above, the transit of unaccompanied Central American children through Mexico to the U.S. has become a highly divisive issue in bilateral relations.
President Obama has started to pressure Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto to "thoroughly collaborate" by stopping children at the southern border or deporting them before they arrive to the U.S.
FinAL ReFLections
The important growth of exports to and foreign investment in Mexico from the U.S. and Canada has been insufficient to create the jobs needed, push wages up and reduce the pressure to emigrate to the United States as nafta negotiators had hoped, mainly during the first 15 years of its operation. We must recognize that the recurring, prolonged economic crises that we have experienced during the period analyzed, together with the complex readjustments in the Mexican economy have not benefited certain sectors like agriculture, but rather have caused severe regional inequalities. The important wage differentials for the same kinds of jobs that make U.S. salaries much more attractive for Mexicans, the dependence on remittances they send from abroad, and the growing, deeply-rooted, highly technical social networks that have grown during the last 20 years have been determining factors in continuing to make migration very attractive, influencing people's decision to emigrate north.
nafta, an expression of the economic ties among these three countries, undoubtedly did create a space for greater formal and informal, documented and undocumented labor mobility than expected when it was conceived. As trade partners, we must take responsibility for the direction we take in the near future. For that reason,
we should ask what the next step through or within nafta should be. Is it feasible to renegotiate this treaty to include some immigration mechanisms to increase labor mobility? Now that Mexico has approved an energy reform that it had considered non-negotiable, could this be a good opportunity for a more ambitious regional project including labor? In the case of Canada, is it possible to strengthen our ties to build bridges to eliminate the visa imposed for Mexicans in 2009? Is it relevant to ask ourselves what our next step within nafta should be?
Given the infrastructure created by nafta, it is essential that the Mexican government explore the possibility of establishing a collateral or derivitive treaty within nafta to increase the number of tn visas for Mexicans as an option for medium-or low-skilled labor mobility and to expand the categories, so current undocumented Mexican workers are allowed to adjust their status to the tn status requirements.
This labor is clearly required in the U.S., given the fact that a large proportion of the 6.5 million Mexican undocumented migrants have jobs.
The U.S. Congress must urgently approve truly comprehensive immigration reform to provide opportunities for increasingly vulnerable unauthorized migrants.
Meanwhile, deportation relief is also urgent for this community. nafta may be an ideal platform upon which to base immigration reform, at least as it pertains to Mexico and Canada. Mexico does not have any migratory privileges, not even the "waiv- Some deported aliens may attempt to return when the U.S. economy improves more, because they left very close family members all over the country.
Finally, more educational exchanges must be encouraged; one of the projects could be the creation of a program including technical training of temporary migrants, with the aim of their returning to their places of origin to contribute there for the benefit of a future North American community. New avenues should be built to foster a real North American region, not only to be more competitive, but also to share responsibilities among the three member countries in trying to solve the migration dilemma that has been growing since the creation of nafta 20 years ago.
